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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, z 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : Case No. 19884 
- v - : 
JOHN CHARLES CLOUD, : P r i o r i t y No. 2 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendan t was c h a r g e d w i t h second d e g r e e m u r d e r , a 
f i r s t d e g r e e f e l o n y , under UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 3 ( a ) and (b) 
(Supp . 1 9 8 5 ) . A f t e r a j u r y t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of t h e 
c h a r g e d o f f e n s e . The t r i a l c o u r t s e n t e n c e d him t o a te rm of f i v e 
y e a r s t o l i f e i n t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The S t a t e does n o t d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t of t h e 
f a c t s of t h e c r ime s e t f o r t h i n t h e C o u r t ' s o p i n i o n i n S t a t e v . 
£Loild, U tah , P .2d , No. 1 9 8 8 4 , s l i p . op . a t 1 ( f i l e d May 
2 3 , 1 9 8 6 ) . 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. In Brown v, Pickardr denying reh'g. 4 
Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for 
determining whether a petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
f a i l e d t o consider some material point in the 
case r or that i t erred in i t s conclus ions f or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing* 
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 ( c i t a t i o n omit ted) . In Cummings v-
HifiJLaoilr 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court s ta ted: 
To make an appl i ca t ion for a rehearing i s a 
matter of r ight , and we have no des ire t o 
discourage the pract ice of f i l i n g p e t i t i o n s 
for rehearings in proper c a s e s . When t h i s 
court , however, has considered and decided 
a l l of material quest ions involved in a case , 
a rehearing should not be applied for , unless 
we have misconstrued or overlooked some 
material fact or f a c t s , or have overlooked 
some s ta tu te or dec i s ion which may a f fec t the 
r e s u l t , or that we have based the dec i s ion 
on some wrong pr inc ip le of law, or have 
e i ther misapplied or overlooked something 
which mater ia l ly a f f e c t s the r e s u l t . . . . 
If there are some reasons, however, such as 
we have indicated above, or other good reasons, 
a p e t i t i o n for a rehearing should be promptly 
f i l e d and, i f i t i s meri tor ious , i t s form 
w i l l in no case be scrut in ized by t h i s court . 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of t h i s 
brief w i l l demonstrate that , based on these standards, the 
S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n for rehearing i s properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court in State v. Cloud, Utah, P.2d , No. 
19884 (filed May 23, 1986), misapplied the "essential evidentiary 
value" test, earlier established in State v. Garcia, Utah, 663 
P.2d 60 (1983), by ruling that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in admitting the challenged color photographs. This 
Court also misapplied the "alternative means of evidence" 
analysis of Garcia, and unduly relied on certain "concessions" 
made by defense counsel during the motion to suppress and opening 
statement in reaching its decision. 
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This Court a l s o f a i l e d t o recognize the c r i t i c a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n between autopsy and crime scene photographs. 
Although the autopsy photographs arguably should have befen 
excluded in t h i s case under the e s s e n t i a l evidentiary value t e s t 
of Garcia, and af ter weighing t h e i r potent ia l for prejudice f the 
crime scene photographs were properly admitted under the Garcia 
standard. These photographs, while admittedly gruesomef were 
e s s e n t i a l t o the S t a t e ' s prima fac i e case . They were the best 
ava i lab le means of conveying relevant and e s s e n t i a l information 
of defendant's mental s t a t e . This evidence could not have been 
conveyed to the jury as readi ly and accurately by a l t ernat ive 
means which did not have the attendent risk of prejudice. This 
Court, therefore , incorrect ly concluded that the crime scene 
photographs added nothing to what had already been introduced v ia 
testimony from both the medical examiner and po l i ce o f f i c e r s . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD OF 
STATE V, GARCIA. 6 6 3 P.2D 60 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . 
I t i s beyond dispute that the proposed admission of 
p o t e n t i a l l y prejudic ia l photographs i s governed by the standard 
enunciated by t h i s Court in State v. Garcia f Utah, 663 P.2d 60 
(1983). Garcia, requires that the prosecution demonstrate to the 
t r i a l judge that the photographs1 e s s e n t i a l evidentiary value 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighs the danger of undue prejudice which the 
j u r y ' s viewing of the photographs might crea te . Admittedly, t h i s 
prosecutorial burden c o n s t i t u t e s something more than the mere 
showing of the photographs1 re levance. This Court in State v. 
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£LQUdr Utah, P.2d , No. 19884 ( f i l e d May 23 , 1986) , held 
that the photographs must convey relevant information that cannot 
readi ly be provided t o the jury by l e s s p o t e n t i a l l y prejudic ia l 
means.• £lfiildf s l i p op. at 3 ( c i t a t i o n omitted) . The Cloud 
Court further s tated that : 
even i f the photograph i s the best ava i lab le 
means of conveying the re levant information, 
the e s s e n t i a l evident iary value of that 
information must s t i l l be balanced against 
the potent ia l for unfair prejudice . Xd. 
Prior t o any weighing, however, the t r i a l court must f i r s t 
determine whether the photographs s a t i s f y Garcia's e s s e n t i a l 
evident iary value t e s t . i d . a t 4 . The majority in £lfiiidr 
concluded that "al l the challenged photographs were inadmiss ible 
inasmuch as they held no e s s e n t i a l evidentiary value" t o the 
S t a t e ' s case against defendant. The photographs, according t o 
t h i s Court, added nothing t o what was already before the jury 
readi ly and accurate ly by a l t e r n a t i v e means which were not 
accompanied by the potent ia l prejudice . 
In concluding that none of the challenged photographs 
had any e s s e n t i a l evident iary value t o the prosecut ion's case , 
t h i s Court has not only misapplied i t s own standard, e a r l i e r 
e s tab l i shed in Garcia, to determine a d m i s s i b i l i t y of gruesome 
color photographs, but i t has a l s o f a i l e d t o recognize the 
fundamental and pract i ca l dynamics inherent in criminal t r i a l s , 
e s p e c i a l l y those involving a homicide. The misappl icat ion of 
Garcia1 s e s s e n t i a l evident iary value t e s t in £loiid approaches, in 
a prac t i ca l sense , a new standard of jpejt JS£ i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y for 
such photographs which c l e a r l y exceeds the Garcia standard and 
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compels future prosecutions t o be held in s t e r i l e s e t t i n g s . 
Following jdjQlidf i t i s unclear when, i f ever f the prosecution may 
introduce photographs as part of i t s case - in -ch ie f • 
This Court's misappl icat ion of Garcia i s p a r t i a l l y 
explained by the undue re l iance which the Court placed on 
a l t e r n a t i v e sources of evidence. This Court's conclusion that 
the photographs had no e s s e n t i a l evidentiary value because they 
added nothing which was "put before the jury readi ly and 
accurately by other means not accompanied by the potent ia l 
prejudice" further demonstrates a misappl icat ion of Garcia. The 
Court in £I_&LLd as sa i l ed the prosecutor's use of the photographs 
s ince the defendant "conceded" that he had committed the k i l l i n g , 
that i t had been done i n t e n t i o n a l l y , and that defendant's v ict im 
had r e s i s t e d the at tack. I t was further s tated that defendant 
did not dispute e i ther the medical examiner's testimony as t o the 
time, p lace , or cause of death. This Court then pointed out that 
the medical examiner provided comprehensive testimony, through 
the use of a chart , regarding the condit ion of the body, 
including the l o c a t i o n of the stab wounds, the ir depth, and the 
degree with which they were i n f l i c t e d . There was a l so testimony 
from po l i ce o f f i c e r s as t o the l o c a t i o n , condit ion, and p o s i t i o n 
of the body at the crime scene. Based on t h i s evidence, the 
£LQHd majority reasoned that four of the photographs—the picture 
of Johnson ly ing face up in a pool of coagulated blood and three 
autopsy p ic tures of defensive wounds t o Johnson's hands and 
armpits—had no e s s e n t i a l va lue , l e t alone relevancy to Cloud's 
s i n g l e claim that he had k i l l e d Johnson due to extreme emotional 
d i s t r e s s . 
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This Court1s impractical appl icat ion of Garcia 1s "by 
other means" t e s t has placed a v i r t u a l l y insurmountable onus on 
the prosecution t o prove the e s s e n t i a l value of photographs in 
the face of cumulative evidence. Garcia does not stand for such 
a propos i t ion . The Garcia Court in fact hastened t o point out: 
We have frequently s tated and applied the 
rule that color photographs of the body of 
the victim—even photographs that are grue-
some—are not inadmissible i f they are 
probative of e s s e n t i a l f a c t s , even though 
they may be cumulative of other evidence. 
GarciaP 663 P.2d at 63. Just because photographs may be 
cumulative of other evidence does not mean that the photographs 
are inadmiss ib le . If the evidence t o which those photographs 
r e l a t e cannot be put before the jury readi ly and accurately by 
other means not accompanied by the potent ia l prejudice , then i t s 
e s s e n t i a l value w i l l more than l i k e l y outweigh the risk of 
prejudice . GarciaP 663 P.2d at 64. By de l ineat ing the other 
evidence which was before the jury, t h i s Court b e l i e v e s that the 
jury could be given an accurate picture of what happened on the 
day of the crime without admitting the gruesome photographs in 
ques t ion . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , in Qarcia, t h i s Court sustained the 
a d m i s s i b i l i t y of photographs which were s imilar to the ones 
introduced in the ins tant case on the grounds that they were 
corroborative of expert testimony or relevant t o the defendant's 
mental s t a t e . 
This Court a l s o in £loud unduly r e l i e d on the s o - c a l l e d 
"concessions11 of defense counsel made during both the p r e - t r i a l 
motion t o suppress and opening statement in determining whether 
the photographs had e s s e n t i a l evident iary value . Such 
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concess ions , however, in the absence of a s t i p u l a t i o n from 
defense counsel as t o the S t a t e ' s proof, cer ta in ly do not render 
most or any elements of the second degree murder charge 
uncontested* 
At the time that the motion was argued before the t r i a l 
judge, the was cer ta in ly no guarantee that the defendant would 
personally t e s t i f y and admit that he had committed the k i l l i n g , 
that i t had been done i n t e n t i o n a l l y or knowingly, or that he 
intended t o cause serious bodily injury and committed an act 
c l e a r l y dangerous t o human l i f e . (j£L££ Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203(a) and (b) (1953), as amended), and that h i s v ic t im had 
r e s i s t e d the at tack. The fac t that Cloud eventual ly took the 
stand and made numerous concessions has very l i t t l e , i f any, 
relevance t o t h i s Court's determination of whether the t r i a l 
judge's dec i s ion , prior to t r i a l regarding the evidentiary value 
of the photographs, was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . No matter how 
many concess ions were ora l ly made by defense counsel during h i s 
motion to suppress and opening statement t o the jury, the State 
was not re l i eved of i t s burden or proving defendant's g u i l t 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of second degree 
murder. Since none of the representat ions made by defense 
counsel during both the motion and opening statement as t o the 
conceded i s s u e s were binding on the prosecutor or the t r i a l court 
and could not be considered as evidence by the jury , .&££ State v. 
JElttiflr 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (1941) (remarks by counsel 
during opening statement t o the jury are not ev idence) , t h i s 
Court's re l iance on them in f inding the photographs inadmissible 
i s c l e a r l y incorrect . The fact remains that only at the 
conclusion of t r i a l did the defendant's asserted mit igat ing 
fac tors of extreme emotional d i s t r e s s become the focus of the 
jury ' s d e l i b e r a t i o n . To view i t otherwise would be t o ignore the 
c r i t i c a l chronology of a criminal t r i a l . 
When the Garcia e s s e n t i a l evidentiary value t e s t i s 
properly applied to the photographs in the instant case , the 
misappl icat ion of the Garcia t e s t in £JLoiid becomes qui te evident . 
Arguably, the three c lose -ups of three defense wounds suffered by 
Johnson—one in the armpit and two in the hands—should not have 
been admitted on the theory that t h i s case r the ir e s s e n t i a l 
evident iary value was not shown. The medical examiner's de ta i l ed 
testimony of the l o c a t i o n of the defensive stab wounds to the 
v i c t i m ' s hands and armpitsr par t i cu lar ly with respect t o the ir 
depth and the force with which they were i n f l i c t e d , readi ly and 
accurately conveyed t o the jury the e s s e n t i a l information which 
the prosecutor desired without the attendant risk of prejudice 
carried by the autopsy photographs. The introduct ion of these 
photographs by the t r i a l judge, however, cons t i tu ted harmless 
error in l i g h t of the overwhelming evidence against defendant and 
the minor cumulative impact the autopsy photographs could have 
had. £££ State v. Wel ls f 603 P.2d 810f 813 (Utah 1979) . This i s 
not t o say, however, that under the Garcia standard there are no 
cases where autopsy photographs' e s s e n t i a l evident iary value can 
be e s tab l i shed and w i l l s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweigh the potent ia l for 
prejudice . Unlike the circumstances in the ins tant case , there 
are cases where autopsy photographs are c r i t i c a l in e s t a b l i s h i n g 
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the entrance and exit of a bullet or in resolving a "battle of 
the experts," 
Unlike the autopsy photographs, in the instant case, 
the essential evidentiary value of the crime scene photographs 
was established and substantially outweighed the potential for 
unfair prejudice, in light of the fact that this evidence could 
not be readily and accurately conveyed to the jury by alternative 
means which were unencumbered by the risk of prejudice. This 
Court, therefore, was incorrect in concluding that the crime 
scene photographs added nothing which was already presented by 
means of police officer and medical examiner testimony. 
In virtually every case, a witness could describe what 
is depicted in a photograph. However, even the most skilled and 
articulate of police officers will offer testimony which is 
replete with obvious inadequacies and inaccuracies not found in 
the crime scene photographs which objectively detail and specify 
what occurred. In the instant case, there was simply no better, 
more accurate and demonstrative way of presenting essential and 
subtle details to the jury than through the Exhibits #6 and #15. 
These exhibits were critical to the issue of 
defendants mental state at the time the homicide was committed 
under all theories charged (intentional or knowing killing or 
intending to cause serious bodily injury, he commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death. iLfifi Utah 
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Code Ann. S 76-5-203(a) and (b) (1953), as amended.)1 I t should 
be noted that the prosecution, in a case involving an ant ic ipated 
defense of emotional disturbance f mustr p r a c t i c a l l y speaking, 
prove that the defendant was not ac t ing under the inf luence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Thus, the crime scene 
photographs in Cloud were necessary and relevant to support the 
S t a t e ' s theory that the f e r o c i t y of the at tack, as accurately 
depicted in the photographs, demonstrated that t h i s part icular 
murder was in tent iona l or knowing, or was an act c l e a r l y 
dangerous t o human l i f e , unfettered by defendant's claim of 
mental or emotional disturbance. Defense counse l ' s concess ions 
prior t o t r i a l and during opening argument did not obviate the 
need and e s s e n t i a l importance of these part icular photographs 
which were at the heart of the S t a t e ' s charge of second degree 
murder. 
Further, considerat ion must a l s o be given t o the 
d i f ferences between crime scene photographs and autopsy 
photographs. Crime scene photographs frequently c o n s t i t u t e the 
primary evidence from which the jury draws i t s inferences and 
conclusions as t o whether the defendant has committed the crime 
for which he has been charged. These photographs, thus , are of 
e s s e n t i a l value to prove the AfiLtus X£J1S and mens X£fl of the 
crime. On the other hand, when expert testimony i s not in 
1 Notably, in Garqia, t h i s Court found a closeup photograph of 
the v i c t i m ' s torso and head showing numerous stab wounds re levant 
to show the nature of the v i c t i m ' s wounds as "clearly dangerous 
t o human l i f e " and t o a s s a i l a n t ' s "depraved indi f ference to human 
l i f e " (two mental s t a t e s under the second degree murder s t a t u t e . 
£££ Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (b) and (c) (1953, as amended. 
dispute, autopsy photographs are often utilized by the 
prosecution to refine and amplify the primary evidence of the 
case-in-chief. In such cases, therefore, there might be less 
essential evidentiary value to support the admission of the 
autopsy photographs. However, the fact that the need for such 
scientific evidence is less in a given case should not bar the 
admission of crime scene photographs which, albeit gruesome, 
accurately depict what happened on the day of the crime. The 
crime scene photographs more accurately depicted what occurred 
and the trial judge was therefore correct in admitting them for 
their relevance to the issue of defendant's mental state. 
Consequently, the prosecution was allowed to include these 
essential photographs as part of its case against the defendant 
and the jury deserved the opportunity to observe what actually 
happened to Johnson in the most accurate and precise way 
possible. GarciaP does not mandate sanitized prosecutions, only 
those which are fair, accurate, and not unduly prejudicial. The 
trial judge, thus, correctly admitted these photographs 
consistent with the essential evidentiary value test of Garcia, 
Finally, the fact that the prosecutor, in the instant 
case, may have placed too much importance on the photograph which 
depicted the victim lying face-down in a pool of blood with her 
middle finger extended in an obscene gesture, in his closing 
argument to the jury, relates to the issue of prosecutorial error 
at the close of trial not to the question of admissibility of any 
of the photographs at the beginning. The prosecutor's possible 
strategic error in argument at the close of trial clearly does 
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not r e l a t e back t o h i s good f a i t h e f f o r t s a t the beginning of 
t r i a l t o introduce the photographs* Accordingly, the 
prosecutor 's preoccupation with a s i n g l e photograph during 
c lo s ing argument does not ra i se e i ther a strong or even 
reasonable inference that the e n t i r e prosecution was ta in ted by a 
dubious and reprehensible motive on the part of the State t o 
inflame the jury. To accept a d i f f erent in terpre ta t ion of the 
prosecutor1 s motive i s to confuse the i s s u e s of the prosecutor's 
advocacy with the photographs1 a d m i s s i b i l i t y . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing d i s c u s s i o n , i t appears that 
the Court has misapprehended previous case law in concluding that 
the challenged photographs were inadmissible due to the i r lack of 
e s s e n t i a l ev ident iary value. Consequently, the S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n 
for rehearing should be granted and t h i s case should be restored 
to the calendar for e i ther reargument or resubmission. ii££ Utah 
R. App. P. 35(c) (1985). A l t ernat ive ly , the Court should modify 
or c l a r i f y i t s opinion t o r e f l e c t a proper appl i ca t ion of State 
v. Garcia, Utah, 663 P.2d 60 (1983). 
The State c e r t i f i e s that t h i s p e t i t i o n i s presented in 
good f a i t h and not for purposes of delay. 
DATED t h i s &VJ2 day
 0 f June, 1986. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINS 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, postage prepaid, 
to F. John Hill, attorney for appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, 333 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this^iZ*L day of June, 1986. 
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ADDENDUM 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.... O O0oo 
The State of Utah, II 19884 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
v. May 23, lc 
John Charles Cloud, 
Defendant a:i ::! Appel 1 ai it. Geoffrey J. Butler, "ITfeTv 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant John Cloud appeals from a jury verdict 
convicting him of second degree murder. Cloud asserts that 
the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victim 
and in refusing his proffered jury instructions. He also 
claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 
conviction. We agree that the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting the photographs and reverse and 
remand for a new trial. 
On the morning of May 23, 1983, the body of Nyla 
Johnson was found in her apartment. Johnson had died of 
multiple stab wounds inflicted several hours earlier by her 
fiance, defendant John Cloud. The homicide apparently 
occurred after a lengthy argument between Johnson and Cloud # 
in which Johnson told Cloud that she intended to break their 
engagement. Cloud was in the apartment when the body was 
discovered. He initially maintained that Johnson had been 
attacked by an unknown assailant, but later admitted killing 
her. 
Cloud was charged with second degree murder under 
U.C.A , 1953, § 76-5-203(a) and (b) (Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, 
Supp. 1985). At trial, the State introduced several 
photographs of the victim that showed the following: 
(i) Johnson as she was discovered by the police, fully 
clothed, lying face down on the floor in a pool of coagulated 
blood with the middle finger of her left hand extended in 
what the State claimed was an obscene gesture; (ii) the body 
after it had been turned over, lying face up in the pool of 
blood; and (iii) close-ups of three defensive wounds suffered 
by Johnson, one in the armpit and two on her hands. The 
State used these photographs to argue that, given the nature 
of the attack and the number of wounds inflicted, Cloud acted 
with the intent necessary to sustain a conviction of second 
degree murder. In his defense, Cloud asserted that his 
alcoholism, coupled with his distress over a prior divorce 
and the traumatic prospect of another failed relationship, 
had created an extreme emotional disturbance so that his 
actions amounted at most to manslaughter. U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-5-205(b) (Repl. Vol. 8B, 1978, Supp. 1985). At!the 
close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on 
second degree murder and manslaughter. The trial court 
refused to give three of defendant's instructions relative to 
manslaughter. The jury thereafter found Cloud guilty of 
second degree murder. 
On appeal, Cloud argues that the trial court erred 
in admitting the photographs and in refusing to give certain 
requested jury instructions. He also contends that the evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of second 
degree murder. We first address Cloud's contention that the 
admission of the photographs constituted reversible error. 
The admission of photographic evidence depicting 
crime scenes and victims' injuries is governed by Utah Rule 
of Evidence 45, which provides that a * judge may in his 
discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its 
admission will . . . (b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice . . . ."* This Court has considered the admis-
sibility of such photographs in a number of cases. See, 
e.g., State v. Garcia, Utah, 663 P.2d 60 (1983); State v. 
Wells, Utah, 603 P.2d 810'(1979); State v. Ross, 28 Utah 2d 
279, 501 P.2d 632 (1972); State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968) (Poe I); cf. State v. Poe, 24 Utah 2d 355, 471 
P.2d 870 (1970) (Poe II). State v. Garcia best summarizes 
the applicable law. Garcia indicated that under Rule 45 and 
our prior cases, when the prosecution proposes to introduce 
gruesome photographs of a homicide victim, the trial court 
should determine whether the viewing of 
the photographs by the jury would create a 
substantial danger of undue prejudice 
against the defendant, and if so, whether 
that danger substantially outweighs the 
photographs' essential evidentiary value. 
The more inflammatory the photograph, the 
greater the need to establish its 
essential evidentiary value . . . . 
Tl Rule 45 was superseded by Utah Rule of Evidence 403, 
which applies to the present case. Rule 403 provides in 
pertinent part: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice . . . .* The language of this 
rule varies slightly from old Rule 45; however, the two are 
substantively identical, and the appropriateness of the 
analysis set forth in Garcia is unaffected by this change. 
663 P.2d at 64 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 
The Court then explained what it meant by balancing 
the "essential evidentiary value" of a photograph against its 
potential prejudicial impact: 
The point of the reference to "essential 
evidentiary value" in the context of 
potentially prejudicial photographs of the 
victim's body is that such photographs 
would generally be inappropriate where the 
only relevant evidence they convey can be 
put before the pury readily and accurately 
by other means not accompanied by the 
potential prejudice. 
663 P.2d at 64 (latter emphasis added). Clearly, i t Is not 
enough that a potentially prejudicial photograph convey rele-
vant information; it must convey relevant information that 
cannot readily be provided to the jury by less potentially 
prejudicial means. See State v. Wells/ Utah, 603 P.2d 810, 
813 (1979). Moreover, even if the photograph is the best 
available means of conveying the relevant information, the 
essential evidentiary value of that information must still be 
balanced against the potential for unfair prejudice. 
Of course, because the admission of such evidence 
under Rule 45 (and its successor, Rule 403) is a matter 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, a trial 
court's decision to admit photographic evidence will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 
663 P.2d at 64, Such an abuse of discretion occurred in 
Poe I, where the trial court admitted autopsy photographs of 
a homicide victim's dissected brain cavity to illustrate the 
path of the fatal bullets. There was no question in that 
case that the victim had died as the result of bullet wounds 
to the head. This Court held that it was reversible error to 
admit the photographs when "[a]11 the material facts which 
could conceivably have been adduced from a viewing of the 
slides had been established by uncontradicted lay and medical 
testimony1' and the sole purpose for introducing the evidence 
was to "inflame and arouse the jury.* 21 Utah 2d at 117, 441 
P.2d at 515. In State v. Wells, the Court also found that 
photographs of a homicide victim had no essential evidentiary 
value because the evidence depicted was already before the 
jury through the testimony of the medical examiner and that 
evidence was not contested by the defendant; therefore# the 
photographs were "superfluous" and had no evidentiary value 
except the "hoped-for emotional impact on the jury." 603 
P.2d at 813. The conviction was not reversed, however, 
because the error was found to be harmless. Id. 
3 
In the present case, Cloud argues that the 
introduction of the photographs constituted reversible error 
because they were unnecessarily gruesome and had no probative 
value as to any disputed issues in the case. The Stqite, on 
the other hand, argues that the photographs were relevant to 
three critical issues: the autopsy photographs of the stab 
wounds illustrated the brutality of Cloud's attack; the 
photograph depicting coagulated blood on Johnson's body 
assisted in determining when the crime occurred; and the 
photograph with the allegedly obscene gesture was illus-
trative of Cloud's mental state. 
Both before the trial court and here, the State 
misperceives the standard laid down in Garcia for judging the 
admissibility of gruesome color photographs. This is best 
illustrated by the record of the lengthy hearing held before 
the trial judge on defendant's motion to preclude admission 
of the photographs. During the hearing, all parties conceded 
that the photographs were very graphic and gruesome. Defense 
counsel argued that the photographs showed nothing that could 
not be established by other readily available evidence. The 
judge repeatedly quizzed the prosecutor as to what the photo-
graphs would prove that was not conceded by defendant or that 
could not be proven through other nonobjectionable evidence. 
The prosecutor did not suggest that the photographs had any 
"essential evidentiary value," as that term is explained in 
Garcia. Rather, he argued that they were admissible because 
they contained relevant evidence. After extensive argument, 
the trial court apparently accepted the prosecution's state-
ment of the law and denied the motion to exclude. In so 
doing, the court erred. 
Under Garcia, potentially prejudicial photographs 
are "generally inappropriate" and should not be admitted in 
evidence unless they have some essential evidentiary value 
that outweighs their unfairly prejudicial impact. 663 P.2d 
at 64. Only after a determination has been made that the 
photographs have such value need the weighing be made. The 
trial court misapprehended the law and for that reason 
admitted the photographs without first properly evaluating 
the evidence. The trial judge's observation that the issues 
for which the photographs were offered were conceded makes it 
fairly plain that the photographs were not admitted for their 
essential evidentiary value. Regardless of how the matter is 
viewed, the conclusion is inescapable that the photographs 
had no essential evidentiary value. All that they showed was 
"put before the jury readily and accurately by other means 
not accompanied by the potential prejudice." Id. Under 
these circumstances, we can only conclude that the 
photographs were proffered and used solely for the purpose 
condemned in Poe I and in Wells—to inflame the jury. 
The State contends that four of the photographs—the 
picture of Johnson lying face up in a pool of coagulated 
blood and three pictures of specific stab wounds to the hands 
and armpits—show the number and location of the woupds, thus 
illustrating the brutality of the attack, and that the coagu-
lated blood is probative of the time of death. In these 
respects, the pictures add nothing to what was already before 
the jury. Cloud had conceded that he had committed the kill-
ing , that it had been done intentionally, and that Johnson 
resisted the attack. Nor did Cloud dispute either the medical 
examiner's testimony as to the time and place of death or the 
cause of death. The examiner also testified in detail regard-
ing the condition of the body, including the location of each 
of the 27 stab wounds, their depth, and the force with which 
they were inflicted. This testimony was aided by a chart of 
the body indicating the position of the body and the location 
of the critical wounds. Police officers also testified as to 
the location, condition, and position of the body at the 
crime scene. Cloud's only contention was that the mental 
stress under which he was acting required a finding that the 
homicide was merely manslaughter rather than second degree 
murder. The photographs were not relevant in any way in 
rebutting Cloud's assertion that he was influenced by extreme 
emotional distress. 
On appeal, the State also argues that the photograph 
showing an allegedly obscene gesture by the victim indicated 
that she defied Cloud and that this motivated him to kill 
her. This ground for admitting the photograph was not 
specifically advanced to the trial judge during the hearing 
on the motion to exclude the pictures, but arose during final 
argument when the prosecutor used the photograph showing the 
gesture to argue the defiance theory to the jury. The claim 
of essential evidentiary value for this photograph does not 
survive analysis. The record does not support a finding that 
evidence of this gesture could not have been presented to the 
jury readily and accurately by other means, such as the 
testimony of the investigating officers or the medical 
examiner. 
It is also worth noting that there is nothing in the 
record to support the prosecutor's claim that the photograph 
shows that the victim made an obscene gesture to Cloud before 
he killed her. This claim, of course, provided the basis for 
the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury that Cloud 
killed her because of the "defiance* shown by the gesture.2 
Yl During his closing, the prosecutor repeatedly held up 
Exhibit 6, which depicted Johnson's body with the middle 
finger of her left hand extended. He argued that the 
photograph illustrated Cloud's state of mind—that he calmly 
(Continued on page 6.) 
Absent some foundation for the speculation that the gesture 
was made volitionally by the victim, the gesture depicted in 
the photograph cannot serve to give the photograph relevance, 
much less essential evidentiary value.3 
The foregoing analysis indicates that the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs. 
The critical question is whether that error was harmless. A 
conviction will not be reversed because of the erroneous 
admission of evidence absent a showing that the error likely 
affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a); U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-30(a) (Repl. Vol. 8C, 
1982) . 
The sole issue before the jury was whether Cloud was 
acting under extreme emotional distress so that the homicide 
amounted only to manslaughter; there was no issue as to the 
intentional nature of the killing or the ferocity of the 
attack. As noted above, the photographs had no essential 
evidentiary value as to any issue in the case and were argu-
ably not even relevant to the central point—the stress under 
which defendant was laboring. Yet the prosecutor fought 
doggedly to get them into evidence during a lengthy hearing 
on Cloud's motion to exclude, arguing that they were relevant 
to the issue. At trial, the photographs were central to 
(Footnote 2 continued.) 
and coldly murdered Johnson because she "defied" him. For 
example, the prosecutor argued: 
[Johnson] defied [Cloud] - and you see 
that last act of defiance in the 
photographs . . . . 
. . . . 
This selfish individual continues to 
stab this lady who defied him, and that 
alone is the basis for the killing. 
• • . . 
She defied him and therefore caused 
him to take her life. There was a reason 
for the killing and it was that defiance. 
And how do we know that? It was that last 
act of defiance (displays exhibit). 
There was no evidence to suggest that the position of 
Johnson's hand was volitional. Given the extensive wounds to 
the hands, it might as easily have been attributable to a 
severed tendon or to rigor mortis. 
3. In addition, the lack of foundation for the inference 
drawn by the prosecutor in closing raises questions as to the 
propriety of the argument presented to the jury and the use 
made of the photograph in the course of that argument. How-
ever, defense counsel made no objection to the argument and 
has not raised the matter on appeal. Therefore, we decline 
to reach the issue. 
the presentation of his case. Not only were all the pictures 
shown to the jury, but the prosecutor's closing argument 
focused entirely on the photograph depicting the victim face 
down in a pool of coagulated blood with the middle finger of 
her left hand extended. See footnote 2, supra. This is not 
a case, then, in which improperly admitted evidence Is periph-
eral. Rather, the improperly admitted photographs here were 
the focus of much of the prosecutor's presentation of his 
case, and the inference is strong that they were used pri-
marily to inflame the jury. Under the circumstances, we 
cannot say that their admission was harmless error. See 
Poe I, 21 Utah 2d at 117-18, 441 P.2d at 515. Therefore, the 
conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial. 
Because this case almost certainly will be retried, 
in Lhe interest of judicial economy it is appropriate for us 
to comment on Cloud's other contentions on appeal that will 
arise again upon retrial. *[W]hen a new trial or further 
proceeding is ordered, it is our duty to pass upon questions 
of law which may be pertinent and helpful in arriving at a 
final determination of the case.* Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 
393, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (1974); accord LeGrand Johnson Corp. 
v. Petersen, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966); Anderson v. 
Utah County Board of County Commissioners, Utah, 589 P.2d 
1214 (1979). Those contentions relate to the trial court's 
refusal to give Cloud's proffered instructions relating to 
the circumstances under which Cloud should be convicted of 
manslaughter rather than second degree murder. We consider 
only the trial court's refusal to give instructions No. 7 and 
No. 24,4 
The jury was informed that if the State established 
that a homicide had been committed but failed to prove any of 
the elements of second degree murder beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it "should consider" the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter. Cloud's proposed instruction No. 24 instructed 
4T Cloud claims that the trial court erroneously refused to 
give his proffered instruction No. 21. Cloud's counsel 
failed to object at trial to the court's failure to give that 
instruction, which would have instructed the jury that *[w]hen 
a homicide which would otherwise be murder in the second 
degree is committed under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explana-
tion, then the offense constitutes manslaughter." Failure to 
object usually results in a waiver, State v. Malmrose, Utah, 
649 P.2d 56, 58 (1982), although this Court may consider a 
matter if the error plainly affects a defendant's substantial 
rights Under the circumstances before us, we find that the 
jury was adequately instructed on the lesser included offense 
of manslaughter. Therefore, we find no plain error in the 
court's failure to give instruction No. 21. 
the jury that if it found that Cloud had committed a homicide 
and there was a reasonable doubt as to which degree of 
homicide he had committed, it "must convict" Cloud of man-
slaughter. That instruction, couched in mandatory t*rms, was 
close to the language of section 77-17-1 of the Codej iwhich 
provides: "When it appears the defendant has committed a 
public offense and there is reasonable doubt as to which of 
two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted only 
of the lower degree." U.C.A., 1953, § 77-17-1 (Repl. Vol. 
8C, 1982) (emphasis added). While the instruction actually 
given by the court attempted to assist the jury in deter-
mining when Cloud should be convicted of manslaughter rather 
than second degree murder, it was not entirely clear. When 
it is plain that a defendant has committed some crime, 
section 77-17-1 reflects an important policy of resolving 
reasonable doubts as to the degree of guilt in the defen-
dant's favor. Therefore, jury instructions on this point 
should follow the statutory language as closely as possible. 
On retrial, the trial court should not refuse to give a jury 
instruction that tracks the statutory language. 
Cloud's proffered instruction No. 7 informed the 
jury that he was not to be found guilty unless the evidence 
"exclude[d] every reasonable hypothesis other than that of 
the guilt of the defendant." We have repeatedly held that if 
the jury is clearly informed of the standard of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, no "reasonable alternative hypothesis" 
instruction is required. State v. Eagle, Utah, 611 P.2d 
1211, 1213 (1980); State v. Burton, Utah, 642 P.2d 716, 719 
(1982). Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, State v. 
Brooks, Utah, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (1981), we conclude that the 
jury was adequately instructed about the elements of the 
crime charged and the standard of proof required. Cloud's 
claim of error in the trial court's refusal to give instruc-
tion No. 7, therefore, is without merit. 
The conviction is reversed. The matter is remanded 
for a new trial. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
No. 19884 8 
HALL, Chief Justice: (Dissenting) 
I am not persuaded that on the facts of tins case 
the trial court abused its discretion by receiving tbe 
photographs of the crime into evidence. 
The burden was upon the State to prove the essential 
elements of the offense of second degree murder as charged. 
Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being 
with malice aforethought, while manslaughter is the unlawful 
killing of a human being without malice.1 
Inasmuch as defendant admitted the killing, the 
basic issue at trial was one of his intent in doing so. 
Defendant testified that he was suffering from extreme mental 
or emotional distress, and therefore the element of malice 
was absent from his actions in taking the life of the 
victim. Consequently, he could at most be convicted of 
manslaughter. The State was thus put to the task of proving 
the essential element of malice. 
It is not disputed that the photographs accurately 
depict the condition of the victim at the scene of the 
crime. The photographs depict the nature and extent of the 
numerous wounds inflicted and the atrocity of the crime and 
are therefore competent, relevant, and material to the issue 
of intent. 
All evidence tends to prejudice the jury, and 
photographs are no exception. The fact that the photographs 
depict a gruesome scene created by defendant is no reason to 
exclude them from evidence if they are otherwise admissible. 
Also, it is not a valid objection that oral testimony has 
been offered regarding the detail shown by the photographs 
because photographs give a much clearer impression than does 
an oral description. 
Applying the essential evidentiary value test as 
espoused by the Court in State v. Garcia,2 I would affirm the 
conviction and judgment of the trial court. 
He. v, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of 
Chief Justice Hall. 
1. Farrow v. Smith, Utah, 541 P.2d 1107, 1109 (1975). See 
also U.C.A., 1953, §§ 76-5-203, 76-5-205. 
2. Utah, 663 P.2d 60, 63-64 (1983). 
